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Abstract
This paper gives a comparative cross-country analysis of the quality of the institu-
tional framework that underpins economic governance in European countries. The paper 
attempts to identify the trends of change in the quality of institutions and determine if there 
is a convergence in the quality of EU institutions. The countries included in the analysis 
are selected groups of EU countries and the Western Balkan Countries. The analysis is 
based on the results of the executive officers’ opinion surveys conducted by the World Eco-
nomic Forum for the Global Competitiveness Index 2003-2009. In order to identify the 
relative quality of public institutions and the trend towards convergence/divergence for 
different clusters of EU countries, a three-pillar composite indicator of institutional qual-
ity was constructed from available WEF indicators. The analysis was conducted at the 
aggregated level as well as for individual countries and pillars, measured in terms of dif-
ference to an average rank of survey response in the EU-14 + EU-8 members. 
Key words: quality of institutions, economic performance, EU, Western Balkans, com-
posite indicators
Introduction1 
The paper aims to provide a comparative cross-country analysis of the quality of the 
institutional framework that underpins the economic governance of European countries 
and affects their economic growth and international competitiveness rank. The paper 
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attempts to identify the trends of change in the quality of institutions and determine if 
there is a convergence or divergence in the quality of EU institutions in the 2003-2009 
period. The analysis also examines at a more detailed level several factors behind institu-
tional similarities/differences in selected clusters of EU countries. 
In the second chapter we briefly deal with the question of why the quality of the in-
stitutional framework (legislative framework, regulative norms, formal and informal rules 
and codes, governing mechanisms) matters for economic growth and competitiveness at 
both country and business sector levels. We try to determine the components of the insti-
tutional quality that we intend to examine. We also define the theoretical and policy frame-
work as well as the starting assumptions for the analyses that follow. 
The third chapter offers some important remarks on the possible benefits and limita-
tions of measuring institutional quality, which provides a broader perspective on the 
strength and validity of such a research exercise. We explain the reasons for the rising in-
terest in the measurement of institutional quality and governance, point out the main prob-
lems encountered by the existing institutional quality indicators and examine the short-
comings and benefits of the assessment tools used. 
In the fourth chapter we elaborate the methodological approach in the analysis of the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) and specify the indicators of the annual Global Compet-
itiveness Index on the basis of which we attempt to measure institutional quality. For the 
purpose of this empirical exercise, we construct the indicative composite “institutional 
quality index” by defining three pillars (the quality of legal protection, quality and bur-
den of regulation and level of corruption). We use 12 selected survey indicators of insti-
tutional quality as an explanatory tool for the levels of institutional convergence attained 
among different groups of EU and Western Balkan countries in the 2003-2009 period.
The analysis in the fifth chapter attempts to find an answer to the starting question of 
whether there is any convergence among European countries in the “institutional quality 
index”; which countries demonstrate positive/negative trends and if any significant devi-
ations are found when the old and new EU-members as well as the selected EU “outsid-
ers” are considered during the 2003-2009 period. 
The sixth chapter is focused on the analyses of country groups, while in the seventh 
chapter we provide some more detailed findings of the main trends at the level of three 
sub-indexes (pillars) of the quality of institutions, in order to identify which institutional 
pillars and which countries account for the most identified trends towards change in the 
quality of institutions.
In the concluding eighth chapter we summarize the main findings of the paper and 
attempt to identify the underlying factors in institutional convergence for the clusters of 
countries that were determined on the basis of our analysis.
 The quality of institutions in European countries and their impact on economic 2 
growth and competitiveness: why does it matter?
The link between quality of institutions and economic growth is theoretically well 
founded and has been repeatedly studied and empirically tested (North, 1990; North, 1997; 
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Olson et al., 2000; Rodrik, 2004; Campbell, 2004; Pedersen, 2008). In particularly since 
the beginning of the 1990s, economists have widely acknowledged the idea that good eco-
nomic institutions in both the public and the private sectors are instrumental in economic 
growth.1 The institutional framework conducive to a functioning market economy is very 
important primarily for the business community but ultimately for all citizens, for their 
living standards and general quality of life. Well designed institutions can trigger econo-
mic growth and act as important growth accelerators (Housemann, Prichett and Rodrik, 
2004). At the business sector level, this link is most evident in investment decisions in 
which investors take into account the quality of institutions as a very important factor for 
the ease of doing business and when assessing the overall risk of future business opera-
tions in a country. The institutional framework could create incentives but also disincen-
tives for economic transactions and business decisions. Firms are generally keen to invest 
in countries with a high respect for and protection of property rights; a developed legal 
framework and enforced rules of law; well developed public services with no burdensome 
bureaucracy, redundant regulation or corruption. It is important that government policies 
are transparent, the judiciary does not hinder business and that there is strong protection 
against crime and fraud. Institutional failures, on the other hand, significantly raise trans-
action costs for firms if public institutions fail adequately to enforce property rights, busi-
ness contracts or fail to ensure an adequate level of information on the market to all mar-
ket agents. Apart from that some rules of conduct and institutional dimensions that fall 
within the area of “ethical behaviour” were also included in our analysis, with indicators 
of business ethics and public trust in the (financial) honesty of politicians, i.e. those cre-
ated by the private sector subjects themselves are also very important and mirror the ca-
pacity of enforcement. These are the elements we have taken into account when measur-
ing the overall quality of the current European institutional framework that affects the de-
cisions of enterprises and market actors and consequently reflects on the countries’ com-
petitiveness rank. 
In short, our analysis is based on the assumption that the quality of institutional frame-
work does matter for the efficiency of economic transactions and economic growth. The 
institutional framework determines the path of economic growth of a country to large ex-
tent and increases our understanding of factors influencing economic growth patterns 
(North, 1990; Pederson, 2008; Rodrik, 2004; Olson et al., 2000). We similarly argue that 
growth and international competitiveness are better in countries which are better governed 
and that differences in performance could also be attributed to the quality of economic 
governance and the institutional framework, i.e. rules, norms, and the formal and infor-
mal codes of behaviour of economic actors. 
Countries which rely on efficient and transparent institutions are better governed and 
have been able to extract therefrom an important “development dividend” for their econ-
omy (kaufmann, 2005). Strong economic growth is usually linked to good governance 
and efficient underpinning from the institutional framework, while poor governance and 
weak institutions might explain the relative failures of reforms (Arndt and Oman, 2008). 
1 The theoretical background could be found in the number of works of many neo-institutional economists start-
ed from North (1990); Williamson (1994); Hodgson (1998); La Porta et al. (1999); Boettke (2000), Pejovich (1995) 
and many others. For the good overview of literature see Campbell (2004).
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We also consider institutional change and convergence as an important public policy in-
strument and a useful explanatory tool concerning reform success for policy makers. In 
the empirical exercise done in this paper, by attempting to measure the quality of institu-
tions, we also attempt to assess the preconditions and capacity for good governance, sus-
tained economic growth and the upgrading of the international competitiveness ranking. 
What factors affect the quality of institutions and institutional competitiveness in Eu-
ropean countries? Is there a converging trend in the quality of institutions as a result of 
the deepening of the integration process within the EU and on the other hand the acces-
sion of new members? What impact do such processes have on candidate countries such 
as Croatia? These are the questions we are dealing with here. Our starting and rather self-
evident assumption is that becoming part of the EU single market affects the quality of 
institutions and economic governance to a large extent. It is also to be expected that an 
important differentiation or even division lines will be formed among EU members (in-
siders) and non-EU members (outsiders). The other expectation is that within the EU it-
self, clear division lines in the quality of institutional framework will be formed among 
Euro Area (where deeper institutional integration exists) and non-Euro Area members. 
In this paper we focus on how the quality of institutional framework and institutions, 
by which we refer to rules, norms, the formal and informal codes of behaviour of econo-
mic actors, affects the convergence trends. The convergence trends are measured by seve-
ral sets of WEF indicators of institutional quality towards two groups of EU countries: (a) 
first to the EU-core countries (countries that joined the EU before 1995) and (b) towards 
the EU-core plus 8 new EU members (that joined in 2004). By institutional convergence 
we have in mind increasing the similarity and complementarities and decreasing the dif-
ferences of basic institutions that rule the formal and informal behaviour of organizations 
and individuals in the process of the integration into the EU institutional system.
 Measuring institutional quality: introductory remarks on potential benefits and 3 
limitations 
Why is it useful to measure institutional quality and explore its correlation with eco-
nomic growth of different countries or their international competitiveness ranking based 
on the benchmark indicators? What might be the limitations and benefits of pursuing such 
a research exercise as the analysis of a large number of different governance and institu-
tional quality indicators? And finally – is an empirical search for an appropriate assess-
ment and measurement tool a “mission impossible” when it comes to satisfying rigorous 
academic analytical standards and therefore doomed to failure? These are questions that 
unavoidably confront every researcher who attempts to approach the problem of the em-
pirical comparison of the quality of institutions in different countries.
The rising interest in the quality of institutions and economic governance has result-
ed in a growing number of studies that have attempted to measure it by cross-country in-
dicators in the last 15 years, especially by international organizations that are the main 
funders of reforms and therefore keen to evaluate their progress even in areas that are hard 
to measure such as for instance effectiveness in combating corruption or the grey econo-
my, the rule of law, protection of norms and judicial independence, etc. (World Bank, 
OECD, ImF, EBRD, EC, etc.). 
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measuring institutional quality, which is an important element in economic govern-
ance indicators, is a methodologically demanding exercise especially when it comes to 
the generation of quantitative indicators. Early experiences with the quantification of the 
quality of broader institutions such as political institutions, economic freedom indicators, 
rule of law, corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, etc. were confront-
ed with many problems (see evolution of POLITY database, International Country Risk 
Guide, Business Environment Risk Intelligence, Index of Economic Freedom, Freedom 
House Reports, Transparency International, World Bank Governance Indicators, etc.).2 
For that reason, measurements started to rely to a large extent on qualitative assessments 
and surveys of country-specific opinions, attitudes and perceptions. Nevertheless, both 
hard data collection and the analyses of gathered survey data have continued to be con-
fronted with many methodological obstacles that tested out their strength and research va-
lidity (Williams and Siddique, 2008; Arndt and Oman, 2006; knack, 2006). Critics refer 
in particular to several key shortcomings of composite cross-country indicators, such as: 
(a) difficulty of comparing different data sources for different countries; (b) difficulty of 
comparisons over longer periods of time; (c) changes introduced over time in the content 
of the indicators themselves; (d) indicators based predominantly on viewpoints are sub-
jective and biased towards the views of the expert and business elite; (e) the data sources 
are overly influenced by recent economic performance and or level of development of a 
country (rich countries do get better results); and (f) flaws in the evidence of the causal 
(two way) relationship between institutions, governance and growth.
Aware of potential pitfalls and in-built deficiencies, researchers have tackled institu-
tional quality measurement in a more and more systematic and cautious manner, especial-
ly since the mid 1990s. These attempts resulted in valuable insights of the possible limi-
tations of the methodology and the ultimate usefulness of research results for analysts and 
policy makers. 
The evolution of indicators such as those of World Bank Governance Indicators, Trans-
parency International, World Economic Forum or OECD Governance Indicators provides 
at least some answers to the above questions. They are summarised well in one of the 
works of kaufmann and mastruzzi (2007), written in an attempt to defend the usefulness 
of institutional and governance indicators in explaining the failures of given reforms or 
policies in a country. 
The experience of the World Bank for instance indicates the problem of the construc-
tion of composite indicators and their sub-components as well as their relevance for pol-
icy making as most of the qualitative indices were actually built upon highly correlated 
indexes and rely on the subjective opinions and assessments of the “country experts”. The 
general problem with producing qualitative indicators is that they could give biased or 
even distorted views, depending on what experts were interviewed and the size of the 
expert survey sample (Williams and Siddique, 2008; knack, 2006). The fact is that most 
qualitative institutional indicators used to measure the quality of institutions in a certain 
country are perception-based although interviews are done with informed experts who 
2 For a thorough overview of evolution of cross-country indicators on quality of institutions and governance see 
Willams and Siddique (2008).
76
K. Jurlin and N. Čučković: Comparative analysis of the quality of European  
institutions 2003-2009: convergence or divergence?
financial Theory and Practice 34 (1) 71-98 (2010)
know the field well. Including more countries into the analysis does not help but aggra-
vate this problem even more.
The time horizon in measurement is also often considered another problem, and hav-
ing consistent data for periods of 5-10 years still does not solve the methodological prob-
lem as the analysts could not say anything about the situation in the preceding years. Prior 
to the measurement of the change in the indicators. For that reason it is quite hard to ac-
cess how profound the institutional change was for the economy and what the lessons for 
policy-making are.
Another problem observed3 is that the questionnaires used for opinion surveys each 
year are not always entirely identical (although a core list of questions are), so the com-
parisons of such indicators are rather difficult and not always precise. Nevertheless, many 
of these different data sets have been aggregated into composite ratings and indicators 
(Williams and Siddique, 2008; Arndt and Oman, 2008). For that reason, the cross-coun-
try and cross-sectional datasets were especially problematic and often misused or misun-
derstood.
The inventory list of other problems related to the use of institutional and governance 
indicators is rather long, and cannot be tackled in depth here. Nevertheless, it is important 
to bear them in mind especially when identifying the policy relevance of such analyses. 
The critics tend to agree that while being useful as a first source of information for inves-
tors, institutional quality and governance indicators do not tell much about the underly-
ing factors that explain the specific position of a country or a sector (Budak and Sumpor, 
2009).
Having said all this, and being fully aware of the possible limitations and benefits of 
the rough cross-country measurement exercise presented in this paper, we were not how-
ever discouraged. In defence of the use of qualitative institutional and governance indi-
cators kaufmann and kray (2007:2), in one of their articles quote Albert Einstein’s say-
ing: “Not everything that could be counted counts and not everything that counts could 
be counted”. In short – the capacity and quality of institutions does count, no matter how 
imperfect the assessment tool might be. This paper is an attempt to contribute to a mean-
ingful analysis of some selected evidence of institutional quality in Europe that we found 
in the available dataset of the World Economic Forum International Competitiveness Index, 
in the period of 2003-2009. The magnifying lens was especially directed towards the ana-
lysis of three sets of institutional sub-indicators important for investors when assessing 
the overall risk of future business conduct in one country.
 Measuring European institutional quality and convergence:  4 
the methodological approach
The empirical analysis that follows is based on the data from the Executive Opinion 
Survey, published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in the Global Competitiveness 
Reports for the period between 2003 and 2009. The WEF survey indicators measure the 
3 For instance in the World Bank, Transparency International, OECD Governance Indicators and also World Eco-
nomic Forum Global Competitiveness Indicators that we use in our analysis. 
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business community perception of many competitiveness factors that can not be meas-
ured by hard statistical data. The survey is conducted every year in a large number of coun-
tries, with a generally identical set of questions and a clearly defined sample, providing a 
sound base for analysis.
Table 1: Methodological approach: indicative institutional index
Subindexes Indicators Original WEF survey questions
Enforcement  
of rule of law 
Judicial independence Is the judiciary in your country independent of influ-
ences of members of government, citizens or firms? 
(1 = No – heavily influenced; 7 = yes – entirely inde-
pendent)
Property rights protection Property rights in your country, including over finan-
cial assets, are: (1 = Poorly defined and not protected 
by law; 7 = Clearly defined and well protected by 
law)
Intellectual property 
protection
Intellectual property protection and anti-counterfeit-
ing measures in your country are: (1 = Weak and not 
enforced; 7 = Strong and enforced)
Reliability of police 
protection
Police services in your country: (1 = Cannot be relied 
upon to enforce law and order; 7 = Can be relied upon 
to enforce law and order)
Regulative  
institutions 
Effectiveness of antitrust 
policy
Anti-monopoly policy in your country is: (1 = Lax 
and not effective in promoting competition; 7 = 
Effective and promotes competition)
Regulation of security 
exchanges
Regulation of securities exchanges in your country is: 
(1 = Not transparent, ineffective and subject to undue 
influence from industry and government; 7 = 
Transparent, effective and independent of undue 
influence from industry and government)
Strength of auditing and 
accounting standards
Financial auditing and reporting standards regarding 
company financial performance in your country are: 
(1 = Extremely weak; 7 = Extremely strong – the best 
in the world)
Burden of government 
regulation
Complying with administrative requirements for busi-
nesses (permits, regulations, reporting) issued by the 
government in your country is: (1 = Burdensome; 
7 = Not burdensome)
Anti-corruption 
institutions
Business costs of corruption Do illegal payments to influence government policies, 
laws or regulations impose costs on or otherwise neg-
atively affect your company? (1 = Yes, they have a 
significant negative impact; 7 = No, they have no 
impact)
Favouritism (clientelism)  
in decisions of government 
officials
When deciding upon policies and contracts, govern-
ment officials in your country: (1 = Usually favour 
well-connected firms and individuals; 7 = Are neu-
tral)
Public trust of politicians Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians in 
your country is: (1 = Very low; 7 = Very high)
Business costs of organized 
crime
Organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extor-
tion) in your country: (1 = Imposes significant costs 
on businesses; 7 = Does not impose significant costs 
on businesses)
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There is a general problem in the analysis of WEF survey data, which are subject to 
changes in overall business sentiment, i.e. perception proved to be rather volatile. How-
ever, the executive survey complements the formal methods of measuring institutional 
development, by trying to depict the impact of the quality of institutions, as witnessed by 
the expert end-users, i.e. well-informed members of the business community.
Although the Global Competitiveness Report already used the “institutions” index as 
a pillar for the measurement of the competitiveness rank, it was not entirely suitable for 
the purpose of our analysis. We aimed to have a somewhat different scope and angle of 
analysis and therefore create targeted sub-indexes, to capture specific issues of the qual-
ity of institutions. We have selected 12 survey indicators to construct three “pillars”, which 
denote different aspects of the quality of institutions. The pillars and corresponding indi-
cators are listed in the Table 1.
The scores of the WEF survey questions are in the range from 1 (worst) to 7 (best), 
averaged at the level of each country and published as such in the Global Competitive-
ness Reports. The original WEF scores for 12 indicators were aggregated (as simple av-
erages) to the level of three sub-indexes and to calculate the final “institutions” index. 
Enforcement of rule of law was measured here by using survey indicators of judicial 
independence, protection of property rights and intellectual property, as well as the indi-
cator of reliability of police protection. The main aim was to assess the general legal frame-
work and the quality of operative judicial (and police) protection of rights, as felt by the 
business sector.
In order to measure the quality of regulative institutions, we employed survey indi-
cators of effectiveness of antitrust policies, regulation of security exchanges, quality of 
audit and accounting, to cover the most important policies by which public institutions 
control the abuse of the rules of free market conduct in the private sector. Apart from that, 
we included the indicator of the burden of government regulation because regulation 
should be effective, however without imposing an excessive burden on free entrepreneur-
ship. 
The quality of institutions that combat corruption was measured by taking into ac-
count survey indicators of business costs of corruption and organized crime, government 
officials’ favouritism and public trust in politicians. Although trust in the honesty of pol-
iticians is presumably influenced by a number of other variables of the institutional qual-
ity, we consider it an important indicator of the (perception of) corruption at the highest 
level.
We have targeted these three pillars to focus on a narrow definition of institutions, 
leaving out the issues of economic policy effectiveness and overall quality of public serv-
ices.  
The analysis is benchmarking the values of these indexes for three groups of coun-
tries, defined for the purpose of this analysis as follows:
EU-14•	  are the old EU members that had joined the EU by 1995 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom);
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EU-8•	  are the states that joined the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia); 
SEECs •	 are the countries that joined the EU in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria), to-
gether with 3 SEE accession countries (Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia).
Luxemburg, malta and Cyprus were not included in the analyses due to lack of WEF 
data, and the small sizes of their economies, which means that their absence will not sig-
nificantly influence the results of the analysis. Other countries of South East Europe are 
not included due to lack of WEF data. The EU-8 group was selected because their reform 
experience is instructive for the candidate countries from the South East Europe. The rea-
son for forming the third group of countries is that, although they are in rather different 
phases of the process of accession to the EU, they are all significantly lagging behind the 
first two groups of countries in terms of economic development and competitiveness.
The analysis has two main purposes. The first purpose is to identify if there is a trend 
of convergence in the quality of institutions (within the scope of the method used) in all 
three groups of countries. The second purpose is to provide some more detailed findings 
of the main trends at the level of the three pillars of institutional quality, in order to iden-
tify which institutional pillars and which countries underline the identified trends of change 
in the quality of institutions. In our analyses we consider upgrading and convergence of 
the quality of institutions an important indicator and illustration of a positive link between 
good governance and economic performance.
What might be the value added of our methodological approach when compared to 
the already existing WEF Global Competitiveness Index or for that matter the World Gov-
ernance Indicators of the World Bank? We definitely do not have the ambition to intro-
duce a new composite Institutional Index. Our intention was merely to select the indica-
tors of institutional quality that present more vividly the cracks in the institutional frame-
work thus capturing more clearly some important policy issues and lessons from a rather 
different angle. The other aim was to have a simple link to a limited number of indicators 
that would enable us easily to track the probable explanations of the changes at the level 
of (perceived) overall quality of institutions, as well on the level of pillars. To check the 
robustness of our results, different data sources apart from WEF were used to confirm or 
challenge the main identified trends.
 Main trends: is there improvement and convergence in the quality of European 5 
institutions?
Good governance and institutions have undoubtedly contributed to the economic de-
velopment and growth of EU countries over the last 50 years.4 The improvement of insti-
tutions became even more important with the formation of the single market and within 
the process of accession of new members. However, our analysis is focused on a rather 
limited time horizon – the very recent period from 2003 to 2009, by attempting to iden-
tify if there is a convergence trend in institutional quality both within the EU insiders and 
between the EU old and the new and future members.
4 Easterly and Levine, 1997; Johnson, kaufman and Schleifer, 1997; Lippert and Umbach, 2005.
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The current EU economic governance regime and practice as well as underpinning 
institutional framework reflects to a great extent the prevailing “soft” coordination meth-
ods as apart from the monetary policy, most economic policies and institutions remained 
in the competence of national policy-making. For that reason, the current economic gov-
ernance mechanisms have leaned more towards the regime of soft intergovernmental co-
ordination than implementing an efficient and harmonized EU-wide mix of institutions 
that govern the behaviour of economic agents and individuals. The current economic gov-
ernance and institutional framework also reflects divisions among functions of state and 
markets in member countries (Begg, 2008; marcussen, 2006; Dyson, 2002; Umbach and 
Wessles, 2008; Dahausse, 2008). The divisions are also substantial between Euro zone 
and non-Euro zone members (Dyson, 2008).
Although several issues covered by the indicators of institutional quality we selected 
fall under the jurisdiction of the European Commission and commonly agreed regulatory 
and legislative framework within the acquis communautaire determined by the treaty on 
EmU, most of the indicators are still mainly under the competence of national legislation 
and policy-making.5 Out of our three pillars, only some regulatory and market competi-
tion protection institutions are under the auspices of EU institutions. Development of in-
stitutions is still to a large extent subject to national legislations and policies, although 
they accepted the EU and international standards (enforcing property rights, intellectual 
property protection, accounting standards, etc.). Apart from that, certain elements of in-
stitutional quality, such as judiciary efficiency and the fight against corruption must be 
improved in all member states, especially in the countries that have historically faced the 
most significant problems such as Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Greece. Therefore, a trend 
of convergence in the quality of regulatory and other institutions (broadly defined) will 
illustrate the extent of the successful integration of the EU institutions.
With an attempt to measure the level and direction of convergence, we have calcu-
lated a simple Coefficient of variation6 for the selected groups of countries. The results 
are shown in Figure 1. 
If convergence is present, a downward slope of the coefficient of variation curve is 
present. We found rather unexpected developments, summarized as follows: 
for the most important level, i.e. for assessing intra-EU convergence (EU-22 = •	
EU-14 + EU-8), there was a significant convergence episode in 2005, followed by 
a slow but clear and persistent divergence thereafter;
in the case of EU-14 (old members), a similar one-off convergence episode occurred •	
in 2005, however a strong trend of divergence is evident for the whole period under 
review;
in 2005, a strong convergence between EU-8 (new members) occurred, with stag-•	
nation since;
5 Renewed Lisbon’s governance instruments within the Open mechanism of Coordination (OmC) rely heavily 
on voluntary arrangements, leaving the individual member states to support the EU economic reform by own policies, 
taking more responsibility for it, and at the same time learning from other experiences (benchmarking), while view-
ing the Commission role more as a facilitator rather than the manager or controller of what is being done (EC, 
2008).
6 Coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. It is defined 
as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean (average value).
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the difference between SEE countries increased in 2006 (i.e. they diverged) and the •	
variation coefficient remained stable since;
if we take into account the whole sample of the countries, i.e. 27 countries, there is •	
a general convergence trend, especially strong in 2005. 
Figure 1: Coefficient of variation of the indicative institutions quality index
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
It is not easy to explain the convergence episode in 2005 at the aggregate level, which 
may be a result of the “enlargement euphoria”, that moved perception of the quality of 
institutions (as well as the perception of overall competitiveness) upwards in a number of 
countries. 
However, the overall divergence trend in recent years at the level for assessing intra-
EU convergence (EU-22 = EU-14 + EU-8) seems more founded on the data. The main 
reason behind the trend is strong divergence of the (perceived) quality of institutions be-
tween the old EU member states, clearly indicated with an upward curve for these coun-
tries. By contrast, variation among the new members has significantly decreased in 2005 
and remained rather stable. In short – the gap between the two clusters of countries re-
mained rather substantial.
The convergence for the whole sample of countries (including non-members) is al-
most solely attributable to a general improvement of the quality of institutions in the SEE 
countries, however inadequate. In order to illustrate that, we shall consider the absolute 
values of the “institutions” index (Figure 2).
At the level of overall indicative institutions quality index for old EU members (EU-14) 
there was a very slow upward trend until 2006 and a significant fall thereafter. Although 
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the fall was not immense, it indicates that there was no improvement in the quality of in-
stitutions in the EU in recent years, as perceived by “users”, i.e. business sector. The out-
come of the new EU members (EU-8) was also weak, showing that these countries may 
have not improved the quality of their institutions as they would have had to in order to 
catch up with the level of the old members. The difference between the two groups of 
countries remained largely unchanged throughout the period under review, only to be re-
duced in 2009, but not due to improvement in the new members, but due to the fall of the 
value of index for the old EU members. One rather simplified explanation might be that 
the economic governance mechanisms within the OmC do not exert such pressures to 
converge as prior to membership when the drive of Europeanization of their institutions 
was almost a must. 
Figure 2: Indicative institutions quality index
 difference between EU-14 and EU-5     difference between EU-14 and EU-8     
 EU-14 (old members)     EU-8 (new members)     
 SEE-5 (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia)
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Note: Difference between the groups of countries is calculated by simple subtraction of the values 
of the pairs of indexes for each year.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
This may be connected to the “reform fatigue” that was predicted by some analysts 
even before the accession in 2005. In the 2004 speech, the Vice President of the Europe-
an Central Bank7 predicted that “EU membership is not sufficient to ensure continued eco-
nomic success and real economic convergence of the new EU countries with the older 
member states. There is a risk that reform fatigue will set in after EU accession, because 
the incentive for reform may no longer be as strong as before”.
7 Opening address at the Third ECB Central Banking Conference “The new EU member States: convergence 
and stability” speech by Lucas Papademos, Vice President of the ECB Frankfurt am main, 21 October 2004, availa-
ble at: [http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2004/html/sp041021.en.html2004].
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In the field of institutions, exactly this might have happened. The WEF (2009, p. 26) 
pointed out that: “While this relative flexibility and stability will provide advantages on 
the way to recovery, the Global Competitiveness Index points to other areas that will need 
to be addressed on a priority basis in the region. most of all, the countries’ institutional 
environments will need to be strengthened. much progress has been achieved since the 
early days of transition, but even the regional best performer in this area, Estonia, ranked 
31st, does not reach the average level of the EU-15 with respect to the quality of public 
institutions; other relatively advanced countries from the region, such as the Czech Re-
public (66th) or Slovenia (43rd), lag behind by an even wider margin. (…) Stronger pri-
vate and public institutions would ultimately reduce vulnerability related to greater inte-
gration with the global economy.”
The SEE countries showed a slow but rather persistent improvement from a low level 
below 3 (1-7 scale) in 2003 towards the (still low) level of 3.5 in the last two years.
According to the EBRD (2009, Chapter 1, p. 3) “One region where progress remains 
evident and several upgrades have occurred is the Western Balkans. All countries in this 
region are either candidate or potential candidate countries for membership of the Euro-
pean Union and, as the experience of previous candidates (and now members) has shown, 
this provides an important motivation to reform.” The EBRD recorded 7 upgrades in the 
SEECs (including Croatia), while for the transition countries that joined EU in 2005, there 
were only two upgrades and one downgrade.
Figure 3: Catching up: WEF based pillars; EU-14=100
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     anti-corruption institutions EU-8     protection of rule of law SEECs
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
To get into more detail, we will present the values of our three selected pillars, i.e. 
enforcement of rule of law, regulative institutions and anti-corruption institutions (Figure 
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3). In parallel we will present the relative values of 3 out of 6 sub-indexes (dimensions) 
of the World Bank Governance Indicators, i.e. rule of law, regulatory quality, and control 
of corruption (Figure 4). These 3 pairs of sub-indexes are very differently defined and 
calculated, however their meaning and capture to a large extent correspond to each other. 
The presented WB indicators cover the 1996-2008 period, while the WEF data are for the 
2003-2009 period.
Figure 4: Catching up: World Bank Governance Indicators; EU-14=100 
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
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Source: World Bank Governance Indicators database [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
index.asp]
The range and values of indicators are rather different due to the nature of sub-index-
es and indicators embedded. However, there are several similarities.
For regulative institutions (WEF) and regulatory quality (WB) the catching up was •	
by far the most successful. EU-8 countries reached a (stylized) level of 90% of the 
EU-14 average, and the CEECs reached a satisfactory level. What is equally im-
portant, the improvements, as compared to the EU-8 average, have continued 
throughout the period under review.
The fight against corruption in the new EU members has been at a stalemate •	
according to both sub-indexes. SEECs have advanced considerably; however, the 
level is still low.
Protection of rule of law proved to be the most difficult field of catching-up with •	
the EU-14. For the EU-8, the advance is going at a snail’s pace and the SEECs are 
a long way from getting to a satisfactory level. The advance in the last years under 
review is not due to improvement in the two groups of countries, but due to dete-
rioration in the old EU members. 
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Analysis at the different country-groups level6 
In further analysis we will examine the trends of the “institutions” index on the level 
of countries under review. The old EU members may be divided in two groups when con-
sidering level and dynamics of the quality of institutions. The first group consists of coun-
tries with scores above 5.0, in spite of a significant fall in the last year (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Institutions quality index 2003-2008: “old and successful members”
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 Sweden     Denmark     Finland     Netherlands     
 Germany     Austria      Ireland
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
At the top of the list there are the Nordic countries: Finland and Denmark, joined by 
Sweden in 2009, following a rather significant improvement of the perceived quality of 
institutions. Netherlands, Germany and Austria experienced very similar upward trend 
until 2007, witnessing a downturn in the last two years. The main reason for a significant 
fall in the last year lies in worsened survey responses for favouritism in decisions of gov-
ernment officials and a fall of public trust in politicians. It seems that the business com-
munity consider their politicians and officials responsible for not preventing the financial 
crisis by more adequate policies. Apart from that, in Austria and Ireland, there was a strong 
drop in the perception of quality of regulation of security exchanges, which is no surprise 
having in mind the unprecedented drop in the stock markets.
The second group of old EU members consists of countries with scores below 5.0, 
and without sound improvement throughout the period under review (Figure 6).
The deterioration in 2009 common to this cluster of countries was expected, bearing 
in mind how hard they were hit by the global financial and economic crisis. For some 
countries worsening in the institutions index was noticeable even in the earlier years. 
86
K. Jurlin and N. Čučković: Comparative analysis of the quality of European  
institutions 2003-2009: convergence or divergence?
financial Theory and Practice 34 (1) 71-98 (2010)
According to Transparency International (2009), Greece gives particular reasons for con-
cern, with its “insufficient levels of anti-corruption enforcement, lengthy delays in the ju-
dicial process and a string of corporate corruption scandals which point to systemic weak-
nesses. Greece’s poor score shows that joining the EU does not automatically translate 
into a reduction in corruption”. According to Heritage Foundation (2009, p. 225), for Italy, 
“Property rights and freedom from corruption are relatively weak”.
Figure 6: Institutions quality index 2003-2008: old EU members facing problems
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
Following the analytical approach that we have used, and in the period under review, 
the divergence among the old EU members is to be largely attributed to the significant 
worsening of the position of certain countries.
As shown previously, on average the new EU member states face a certain stalemate 
in the quality of institutions, without clear convergence towards the EU average (Figure 
7).
Only Estonia and Slovenia keep in line with the successful old EU members, while 
other countries face some sort of “institutional quality worsening”, most evident in the 
case of Hungary, and also in Slovakia and Latvia in recent years. According to Transpar-
ency International (2009) “Latvia has suffered from the government’s bailout of a local-
ly-owned bank at the end of 2008, which eventually contributed to the collapse of the 
Latvian economy”. 
Hungary is somewhat different from the other countries, with a worsening of posi-
tion starting from 2006 and for Hungary, the Heritage Foundation (2009, p. 209) stated 
that “The rule of law is strong, and corruption is perceived as moderate. Challenges include 
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the need for fiscal consolidation and better management of public finance.” However, the 
WEF indicators record worsened perception of corruption, problems connected with prop-
erty rights and the burden of regulation.
Figure 7: Institutions quality index 2003-2009: new members
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 Latvia     Lithuania     Hungary     Slovak Republic
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
Turbulent developments are evident in Lithuania and Poland, while Poland surpris-
ingly improved its position in the 2009, as compared to 2004. According to WEF (2009, 
p. 25), Poland “…has seen measurable improvements in the quality of its public institu-
tions, with greater confidence in the efficiency and honesty of the country’s public serv-
ants. EU membership and buoyant growth over past years have provided an incentive and 
the means for conducting reforms. This, along with prudent regulation of financial mar-
kets and the large size of the domestic market, has helped Poland to weather the effects 
of the current global downturn and become one of the most economically stable countries 
in the region”.
The South East European countries show an upwards trend as they are, in different 
phases of institutional reforms, under strong pressure of Europeanization (Figure 8). 
While Croatia lost momentum in the last 2 years, which might be partly explained by 
the Slovenian blockade of negotiations in the last year, the upwards trend is evident in the 
case of Romania and macedonia. For macedonia, the improvement may be linked to the 
reforms within the framework of the EU accession. As stated in the Progress Report for 
macedonia (Commission of the European Communities, p. 28), “The legal system for a 
functioning market economy is largely in place. The financial independence and admin-
istrative capacity of regulatory bodies were strengthened. Clarification of property rights 
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has further advanced. (…) Corruption has been addressed by policy measures, but remains 
prevalent in many areas.”
Figure 8: Institutions quality index 2003-2009: SEECs
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
Surprisingly, Bulgaria, which recently became a EU member, according to selected 
indicators, performs at a same low level as Serbia, which is only in the very early phase 
of institutional adjustment to cope with the acquis. In Bulgaria “Reforms were introduced 
in the customs and border police with the aim of freeing an additional 600 million euro 
in blocked EU funds. However, reforms to curb political corruption and address organ-
ised crime have yet to be introduced” (Transparency International, 2009).
Analysis at the level of indicators 7 
In further analysis we attempt to identify in more detail what led to the convergence/
divergence trend in the quality of institutions within the period under review, using the 
methodology we employed. In order to do that, we have presented average values for each 
of 12 survey indicators creating three pillars, averaged for the 3 country groups under re-
view (EU-14, EU-8 and SEECs). 
In that way we are able to analyse dynamics of change at the level of indicators and 
determine what contributed the most to the above presented trends of institutional quality 
in the recent years.
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7.1 Enforcement of rule of law
Enforcement of the rule of law was measured with survey indicators of judicial inde-
pendence, protection of property and intellectual property, as well as the indicator of the 
reliability of police protection (Table 2). The main aim was to assess the general legal 
framework and quality of operative judicial (and police) protection of rights, as felt by the 
business sector. 
Table 2: Protection of rule of law 
Judicial 
independence
Property rights 
protection
Intellectual 
property protection
Reliability of 
police services
EU-14
2003 5.4 5.8 5.4 5.5
2004 5.6 5.9 5.5 5.5
2005 5.3 5.9 5.4 5.5
2006 5.5 6.1 5.6 5.7
2007 5.6 6.1 5.6 5.7
2008 5.6 6.0 5.5 5.8
2009 5.5 5.8 5.3 5.7
EU-8
2003 4.2 4.6 4.0 3.8
2004 4.0 4.7 3.8 3.9
2005 3.8 4.8 3.8 4.1
2006 4.0 4.9 4.0 4.3
2007 4.1 5.0 4.0 4.3
2008 4.1 5.0 4.0 4.3
2009 4.1 4.7 4.0 4.3
SEE
2003 2.6 3.0 2.6 3.5
2004 2.6 3.4 2.8 3.4
2005 2.6 3.6 2.7 3.5
2006 2.7 3.8 2.9 3.5
2007 2.9 3.9 3.0 3.9
2008 3.0 4.0 3.1 4.1
2009 3.0 3.8 3.1 3.9
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
In the old EU members, a strong deterioration of property rights’ protection was evi-
dent even before crisis, i.e. from 2007, while the other 2 indicators fell in 2009. In con-
trast to the EU-14, the selected new EU members show upward developments but are still 
far behind the average EU-14 institutional quality line. However, as a result of the finan-
cial and economic crisis, the perception of property rights protection has deteriorated in 
the EU-8 too. In the SEE countries, significant improvement is evident, but judicial inde-
pendence is still very much lagging behind the EU members average. In 2009 there was 
a notable worsening of quality of police services and protection of property rights.
The presented findings may be also backed up by selected hard data from the World 
Bank Doing Business database that may serve to illustrate the quality of property protec-
tion and efficiency of legal framework (Table 3).
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Table 3: Selected World Bank Indicators for protection of rule of law
Time to enforce 
contracts (days)
Cost to enforce 
contracts  
(% of claim)
Bankruptcy 
recovery rate (cents 
on the dollar)
Time to finish 
bankruptcy 
procedure (years)
SEECs
2003 647.4 24.8 21.3 3.5
2009 528.4 25.7 27.5 3.1
EU-8
2003 626.3 20.4 33.5 3.6
2009 587.5 21.7 37.1 3.1
EU-14
2003 538.2 19.8 70.9 1.4
2009 529.2 20.0 71.5 1.3
Source: Data base of Doing Business 2003-2009, available at: [www.doingbusiness.org]. 
The SEECs have advanced considerably in the last 6 years. The time to enforce con-
tracts in these countries converged to the EU-14 level, which is even better than for the 
EU-8 countries. However, the cost of enforcing contracts is still substantially higher. In 
spite of advances, the legal system in the SEE is still not efficient when it comes to bank-
ruptcy procedures, with the recovery rate still below 30%. It is evident that old EU mem-
bers are far ahead of both EU-8 and SEE countries according to the bankruptcy loss and 
time to finish procedure.
7.2 Regulatory framework institutions
Regulatory quality indicators have become an important practice in the EU when 
measuring the success of the Lisbon Strategy in achieving its goals in member states. In 
2004 the European Commission adopted an integrated regulatory impact assessment to 
measure various costs and benefits associated with the legislative and regulatory changes 
as well as a cumulative impact of quality of regulatory environment on the economic per-
formance and competitiveness of member states (European Council, 2004). Traditionally, 
for many years these were the assessment tools of OECD and World Bank8 which meas-
ured it by composite indicators in yearly surveys for Worldwide Governance Indicators 
with an attempt to link regulatory reforms and modes of public governance with perform-
ance indicators of the examined countries. Reducing the regulatory burden as a constrain-
ing factor of country competitiveness is also one of the avenues to go down (regulatory 
guillotine) in line with the goal of decreasing the administrative burden for business set 
by the revised Lisbon Strategy. 
The regulatory framework pillar shows that old members generally have witnessed 
stagnation until 2007, with a strong fall in the last 2 years (Table 4).
This could reflect the strong impact of the financial crisis on the perception of select-
ed indicators of regulatory quality by the surveyed managers, while the indicators with 
the strongest decline were Regulation of Security exchanges. 
8 See Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.
asp]. 
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Table 4: Regulatory framework institutions
Effectiveness 
of antitrust 
policy
Regulation 
of security 
exchanges
Strength of auditing 
and accounting 
standards
Burden of 
government 
regulation
EU-14
2003 5.3 5.8 5.9 3.0
2004 5.3 5.8 5.7 3.2
2005 5.4 5.7 5.8 3.2
2006 5.5 5.8 5.9 3.2
2007 5.4 5.6 5.9 3.2
2008 5.3 5.6 5.8 3.1
2009 5.1 5.1 5.5 3.1
EU-8
2003 4.2 4.9 5.0 3.0
2004 4.1 4.7 4.8 2.9
2005 4.4 4.8 5.1 3.0
2006 4.4 4.7 5.0 3.1
2007 4.4 5.0 5.0 3.1
2008 4.3 4.9 5.1 3.0
2009 4.3 4.6 5.2 3.1
SEE
2003 3.1 3.9 4.1 2.3
2004 3.0 3.9 4.1 2.6
2005 3.1 4.3 4.3 2.6
2006 3.2 4.1 4.2 2.7
2007 3.3 4.0 4.3 2.8
2008 3.3 4.0 4.3 2.8
2009 3.4 3.9 4.4 2.8
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
On the other hand, new EU members again show an upwards trend, driven by the im-
proved perception of the Strength of auditing and accounting standards, with only dete-
rioration in Regulation of security exchanges, brought about by the enormous losses in 
stock exchange in these countries in the last 2 years.
Developments in the SEE were very similar, with continuous improvement in the 
effectiveness of antitrust policy. It is interesting to note that there is virtually no difference 
in the perceived burden of government regulation in all 3 country groups, while the other 
3 indicators are very different, with less developed countries lagging behind and rather 
slowly catching up.
The presented findings may be tested by the selected hard data, from the World Bank 
Doing Business database, chosen to illustrate the burden of regulation (Table 5).
The time to start a business is now similar in all 3 groups of countries. The SEECs 
have significantly advanced in registering property from 253 days in 2005 to 67 in 2009, 
which is a better figure than that for the new EU members. However, getting construction 
permits in the SEECs has become more difficult. The old EU members are still far ahead 
of the other 2 groups of countries, especially in time for registering property and time for 
paying taxes. 
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Table 5: Selected World Bank Indicators for regulatory framework
Starting a 
business (days)
Dealing with 
construction 
permits (days)
Registering 
property (days)
Time for paying 
taxes (hours 
per year)
SEECs
2005 29 233 253 283
2009 13 245 67 274
EU-8
2005 34 218 114 355
2009 15 202 96 298
EU-14
2005 23 174 49 198
2009 15 163 32 186
Source: World Bank, Doing Business, 2005-2009. 
7.3 Anti-corruption institutions
It is interesting to note from that there is no clear trend of improvement in the (per-
ceived) quality of anti-corruption institutional scores for either old or new EU members 
(Table 6).
Table 6: Anti-corruption institutions
Business costs  
of corruption
Favouritism 
in decisions of 
government officials
Public trust  
of politicians
Business costs 
of organized 
crime
EU-14
2003 5.3 4.3 3.8 5.8
2004 5.9 4.3 3.9 5.8
2005 5.8 4.2 3.9 5.8
2006 6.0 4.2 3.9 5.8
2007 5.9 4.4 4.1 6.0
2008 5.8 4.6 4.2 6.0
2009 5.6 4.3 4.0 5.9
EU-8
2003 3.9 3.2 2.5 4.5
2004 4.6 3.1 2.2 4.6
2005 4.6 3.0 2.3 4.9
2006 5.0 3.1 2.4 5.0
2007 4.6 2.9 2.5 5.3
2008 4.5 2.8 2.4 5.7
2009 4.2 2.8 2.3 5.8
SEE
2003 2.7 2.6 2.0 3.4
2004 3.7 2.6 1.9 3.6
2005 3.5 2.5 1.9 3.6
2006 3.9 2.5 1.9 3.8
2007 3.7 2.6 2.0 4.1
2008 3.7 2.6 2.1 4.5
2009 3.5 2.6 2.2 4.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEF data 2003-2009.
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On the other hand, SEE countries improved significantly; however, they retained a 
rather low comparative score level. For the old EU members, the fall started in 2007 is 
evident for the business costs of corruption, while corruption of politicians and govern-
ment officials lost momentum in 2009, falling notably. However, there is no emergence 
of mafia (organized crime) activities, and this indicator stood rather well throughout the 
years under review.
New members have also improved in combating organized crime, however corrup-
tion is “alive and kicking”, from 2007 onwards. Public trust in the financial honesty of 
politicians and public servants is very low and further falling, which is rather a surprise 
for the countries that have been full EU members for 5 years.
Table 7: Corruption perception index 
Country 2004 2009 Difference
EU-14  7.64 7.28 -0.36
Denmark  9.5 9.3 -0.20
Sweden  9.2 9.2 0.00
Finland  9.7 8.9 -0.80
Netherlands  8.7 8.9 0.20
Germany  8.2 8.0 -0.20
Ireland  7.5 8.0 0.50
Austria  8.4 7.9 -0.50
United kingdom 8.6 7.7 -0.90
Belgium 7.5 7.1 -0.40
France 7.1 6.9 -0.20
Spain 7.1 6.1 -1.00
Portugal 6.3 5.8 -0.50
Italy 4.8 4.3 -0.50
Greece 4.3 3.8 -0.50
EU-8 4.64 5.26 0.62
Estonia 6.0 6.6 0.60
Slovenia 6.0 6.6 0.60
Hungary 4.8 5.1 0.30
Poland 3.5 5.0 1.50
Czech Republic 4.2 4.9 0.70
Lithuania 4.6 4.9 0.30
Latvia 4.0 4.5 0.50
Slovakia 4.0 4.5 0.50
SEECs 3.18 3.80 0.62
Croatia 3.5 4.1 0.60
Bulgaria 4.1 3.8 -0.30
FYR macedonia 2.7 3.8 1.10
Romania 2.9 3.8 0.90
Serbia 2.7 3.5 0.80
Source: Transparency International, CPI Annual Reports, 2004 and 2009.
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In the SEE countries, trends in the business costs of the mafia and corruption were 
almost identical to those in the new EU members. However, the level of these indicators 
is still significantly lower. Contrary to the EU members, financial honesty of politicians 
is (surprisingly) improving, although still at a low level. Nevertheless, the most notable 
change is a very strong deterioration in the business costs of corruption.
To test the presented findings by the selected other source, we relied on the most com-
mon data of the Transparency International (Table 7).
The table best supports and summarizes the general findings of this paper. On aver-
age, the old EU members still stand well ahead of new members, with SEECs further lag-
ging behind. However, the EU-14 on average declined in terms of the value of Corruption 
Perception Index, with a fall in a number of countries. In 2009 two old EU countries (Italy 
and Greece) had an index value lower than the average of the new members. On the other 
hand, new members all improved their stance regarding corruption perception, with the 
most notable improvement in Poland. However, Estonia and Slovenia stand alone and 
rather high, close to the EU-14 average. Similarly to our findings based on WEF indica-
tors, Bulgaria worsened its position, in spite of becoming a EU member, while other SEECs 
improved significantly. However, all the Western Balkans (SEECs) countries are still worse 
than Slovakia, which is the country with the highest perceived corruption among the EU-8. 
It comes as surprise that Greece, although a EU member for a number of years, has the 
value of indicator identical as for the SEECs average, while scores for Italy are also not 
much better.
Concluding remarks and areas for further research8 
The paper was motivated by the growing interest in the empirical efforts put into 
measuring quality of institutions and governance in the last 15 years. The analyses 
attempted to demonstrate the significant differences among the selected EU and non-EU 
countries in the institutional quality we assessed by indicative “institutional quality index” 
based on 12 various indicators from WEF Executive Survey for Global Competitiveness 
Index Report, 2003-2009. 
While aware of the limitations and benefits of the employed methodological exercise, 
which has some in-built deficiencies9, the presented cross-country comparison may more 
vividly portray the components of the mosaic and will be helpful in explaining the rea-
sons for the convergence and divergence trends in the quality of the institutions that affect 
the economic performance of these countries and perception by investors. 
The general trends identified in our analyses were similar to those identified by World 
Bank Governance Indicators and Transparency International. Interesting differences in 
terms of change of institutional quality were determined among the clusters of countries 
examined.
It is important to note that the difference between the new and old EU members re-
mained rather high and in the last 4 years the new EU members have not improved the 
(perceived) quality of institutions. Additionally, no real convergence trend in the new EU 
members could be detected from the presented data.
9 See kaufman et al. (2007), Arndt and Oman (2006), Williams and Siddique (2008), knack (2006), etc.
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For the third group of countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, macedonia and Serbia) 
the analyses indicated rather strong progress in the quality of institutions, which goes in 
line with complying with the formal convergence criteria as reported by the European 
Commission, and also as measured by the other cited literature. However, looking into 
more detailed indicators we have shown that they still have much to reform, especially in 
several examined fields of institutional quality. Directed efforts are needed especially when 
it comes to improving the independence of the judiciary; enforcement of business con-
tracts as well as in fight against corruption and organized crime especially in Western Bal-
kan countries. 
more detailed examination of specific indicators of institutional quality shows that 
nominal convergence and transposition of EU norms des not necessarily guarantee their 
enforcement. The gap between the adopted and enforced norms is still rather high while 
effectiveness of government in delivering good governance and institutional quality is still 
low. As many other similar reports and studies have demonstrated10, converging institu-
tional environment in terms of quality requirements especially in the new EU members 
and candidate countries is still very much “work in progress”. This is true even of some 
old EU members. 
As an avenue for further research it might be interesting to explore how much the 
2004 enlargement round affected the deterioration of the quality of institutions in old EU 
members due to a negative spill-over effect and the coexistence of some lower standards 
in institutions, for instance in fighting corruption or anti-trust regulations in the new EU 
members. In addition, is the level of average EU institutional quality, and capacity for that 
matter, decreasing or increasing and how may this affect the global competitiveness of 
the EU?
At the end it is important to mention some research questions that will continue to 
occupy researchers as the answers still remain inconclusive. Some of them are: Are insti-
tutional convergence and the synchronisation of institutions that are driven by the deep-
ening of the EU integration process necessarily a good development? Would EU nations/
markets continue to differ and compete with regard their quality and capacity of institu-
tions to trigger economic growth? What would be the impact of their endogenous institu-
tions as a mirror of their imbedded culture, history, creativity and different behaviour pat-
terns in finding multiple solutions to the equation of sustained development and compet-
itiveness? One thing is certain: there is plenty to research into in the future.
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